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IS IT TIME TO RECONSIDER CHEVRON DEFERENCE?
Ann R. Klee†
As this year marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
it is both timely and appropriate to ask: have the courts gone too far in
deferring to agency interpretations of the law, and indeed, to agency
decisions in general? 1
Chevron deference, the doctrine arising from the Court’s decision, has
been a guiding principle during my entire legal career. I have had the
opportunity to experience it from several vantage points: first in private
practice representing clients before various regulatory agencies, then during
my time on the Hill as a Senate staffer drafting environmental laws, then
again in my roles in the executive branch, and now finally as the chief
environmental officer at GE.
From these very different vantage points, I have concluded that Justice
Scalia may have been engaging in a bit of hyperbole when, on the fifth
anniversary of the Chevron decision, he remarked, “[a]dministrative law is
not for sissies.”2
Based on my experience, administrative law, and particularly environmental
law, is no more challenging than many other areas of law that our federal
courts eagerly dive into every day. The interpretation and enforcement of
technology patents come to mind, for example.
But challenging or not, I do think it is fair to say that the practice of
administrative law has been made more frustrating by Chevron.
I have seen how Chevron can shape the application of laws and
regulations, both positively and negatively; how it affects agency behavior
†

Vice President, Environment, Health & Safety, at GE. Previously a partner and cochair of the Environmental and Natural Resources Group at Crowell & Moring LLP, the
author served as General Counsel of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency from 20042006 and as Counselor and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior from 20012004. A graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, she has also served as
Chief Counsel to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. This essay is
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1
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511 (1989).
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and, in particular, the behavior of agency staff; and how it can bias the playing
field in litigation, sometimes leading to patently unfair results.
All of this has led me to ask the question that I will try to answer here:
is it time for us to reconsider Chevron, or at least reconsider the extent to
which we apply it?
The answer, simply, is “yes.” Whether or not our environmental laws are
complex, the Chevron decision, especially as it has been applied, is inconsistent
with the most basic notion of our constitutional democracy—namely that
three coequal branches of government serve as checks and balances against
each other.
In that respect, our federal courts have a critically important
constitutional role to play in reviewing agency interpretations of the law
and agency decisions. Here I would agree with Justice Scalia: administrative
law is not for sissies, especially if they are federal judges. Judges should
not be so ready to defer to administrative agencies, as Chevron
encourages them to do.
My hypothesis is that we would all be better off, as a nation and as
individuals, if the federal judiciary would reassert its role more consistently
in acting as a balance against the executive branch and its regulatory agencies.
The Chevron doctrine’s flaws, and problems generated by the
deferential landscape that it has created, are threefold. First, there is no
statutory support for the doctrine, and its constitutional underpinning is
shaky, to say the least. Second, the expansion of its application has had
pernicious effects, reducing the accountability of an already relatively
unaccountable government-by-bureaucracy. Finally, the doctrine, especially
as expanded, is generally unnecessary as a practical matter. The federal
courts have often used Chevron as a fig leaf to avoid reviewing agency
decisions, especially on technical matters.
I should stop here and note that I am not anti-regulation. I have been in
the shoes of a regulator, and I believe that regulations are important and
necessary, especially in areas like environmental protection. But I also
believe that regulations must be reasonable and consistent with their
authorizing legislation. Congress’s role is also important here, and at the
end of the day democratic accountability is key.
I am also not naive. I recognize that Chevron probably is not going
anywhere any time soon. Still, a doctrine that is so persistent—cited more
than 66,000 times and mentioned in more than 13,000 federal court
opinions—should be re-examined from time to time so that its application
might be tempered by an appreciation of its flaws and changed
circumstances.
It is clearly time to take a hard look at Chevron deference.
I. CHEVRON’S LACK OF STATUTORY SUPPORT
In and of itself, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
was not a particularly interesting case. It dealt with a very specific, somewhat
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boring, technical and arcane regulation promulgated by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), one defining a “stationary
source” under the Clean Air Act.3
Here is how Justice Stevens summed up the pivotal issue of the case:
The question presented by these cases is whether EPA’s
decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting
devices within the same industrial grouping as though they
were encased within a single “bubble” is based on a
reasonable construction of the statutory term “stationary
source.”4
This is hardly the kind of legal question that you might think would generate
a foundational principle of administrative law: the requirement that courts
defer to agency interpretations of the law.
For environmental policy wonks who spend their professional lives
regulating, or trying to comply with regulations, the specific question
presented by Chevron is bread-and-butter stuff—but the technical
aspects of regulation are less familiar for most federal judges. I think
that explains, at least to some degree, why the Supreme Court decided
the issue in the way that it did, and why the doctrine has grown and
expanded.
Given the breadth of Article III, federal judges are generalists. When the
Chevron case arrived at the Supreme Court, I do not imagine that the
justices were chomping at the bit to dig into the details of the meaning of
“stationary source” in the Clean Air Act. 5
To the contrary, several of the justices immediately headed for the exits.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Marshall recused themselves from the
outset, and Justice O’Connor followed them—for family reasons—during
the deliberations. The six remaining justices signed on to a unanimous
opinion authored by Justice Stevens.
We can get some insight into Justice Stevens’ approach from the papers
donated by other justices to the Library of Congress. Apparently, Justice
Stevens originally voted to affirm the D.C. Circuit, which had rejected the
EPA’s interpretation of the statute and adopted its own definition of the term
“stationary source.” But he subsequently changed his mind, and instead
authored the decision to reverse the appeals court and defer to the EPA’s
interpretation.
The papers in the Library of Congress contain several of Justice
Stevens’ margin notes and are illuminating. At one point he noted that the
Conference Committee report was “confusing!”6 In my favorite quote, Justice
3

42 U.S.C. § 85.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
5
U.S. CONST. art. III.
6
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the
Blackmun Papers (University of Maryland School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper
2005-45, 2005).
4
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Blackmun recorded that Justice Stevens said, “When I am confused, I go
with the agency.”7
If you had to distill the Chevron doctrine to nine words, I do not think
you could do better than: “When I am confused, I go with the agency.”
Now, you may ask: what’s wrong with that? After all, the subjects
administered by agencies like the EPA are confusing. And when it comes
to the Clean Air Act, the staff at the EPA are specialists.
The average federal judge, a generalist by necessity, may never have
heard of the phrase “stationary source” before a Clean Air Act case hits his
or her docket. So why shouldn’t that judge “go with the agency”? Why not
defer to the technical expertise of the government’s technical specialists?
As I said at the outset, I think there are several problems with simply
accepting an agency’s interpretation of the law, or its regulations, or even
its decisions.
The first problem is a lack of statutory authority. When a federal court
interprets or applies a federal statute, it is constrained by the language of the
statute. The court must do what the statute tells it to do, and it cannot do
what the statute does not tell it to do.
In Chevron, the courts were interpreting the Clean Air Act, and they
were applying the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).8 Nothing in the
Clean Air Act itself suggested that Congress preferred that the courts defer
to the EPA’s interpretation of the statute because of the agency’s superior
technical expertise.
As for the Administrative Procedure Act, its text, as I read it, is not just
in tension with the Chevron doctrine. I would say it is downright contrary
to it. Section 706 of the APA says that the “reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, [and] interpret statutory provisions.”9 The language
is clear: “[T]he reviewing court shall … interpret statutory provisions.”
There is nothing in the APA that suggests courts should defer to the
regulatory agency. Rather, it states plainly that it is up to the courts to decide
what a statute like the Clean Air Act means and does not mean. Isn’t that
how administrative law is supposed to work in a constitutional system
founded on concepts like “checks and balances” and “separation of powers”?
II. PUTTING FOXES IN CHARGE OF GUARDING HENHOUSES
In 1920, in a case called Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, which
involved the construction of the statute that created the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the U.S. Supreme Court took up the words “unfair
method of competition” and said that “[i]t is for the courts, not the
commission, ultimately to determine as a matter of law what they include.”10
7
Mark Sherman, Supreme Court Climate Case Looks at EPA's Power, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 23, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20141010063855/http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/02/23/supreme-court-climate-cas_n_4841901.html.
8
5 U.S.C. § 551.
9
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
10
Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
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The underpinning of that case was Marbury v. Madison. In Marbury,
the Court said that, as a matter of constitutional power and prerogative, “i[t]
is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what
the law is.”11 You can draw a straight line from Marbury to Gratz. Both
decisions are premised on the fundamental judicial principle that it is up to
the courts to say what the law is.
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council takes a diametrically
opposed view.12 Under the rule of Chevron, it is up to the agencies to say what
the law is, and the courts should defer as long as the agency is not being
“unreasonable.” This reversal led legal scholar Cass Sunstein to describe
Chevron as “merely a counter-Marbury for the executive branch.”13
It is somewhat surprising how little attention has been paid to the
fundamental incongruity between Chevron and Marbury. Chevron
abdicates the role that the Court assumed in Marbury, surrendering territory
that Justice Marshall definitively claimed for the judiciary in 1803.
This brings me to a further problem with Chevron. The broad
application of Chevron deference has created a regulatory landscape where
agencies may in some cases do what they want, rather than what the law
requires or allows them to do. The doctrine puts foxes in charge of guarding
the agency henhouse.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) position in the case
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, which was recently decided by the
Supreme Court, is illustrative. 14 In that case, to further a policy objective—
albeit a very commendable one—the EPA simply “rewrote” the statutory
trigger for entering a pollution control program from 100 tons to 100,000
tons. Although the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the underlying EPA
rule, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, admonished the EPA that its
authority to administer the law “does not include a power to revise clear
statutory terms.”15
I recognize that agencies must have some ability to interpret the bounds
of their authority and implement statutes passed by Congress, but as a matter
of constitutional principle and democratic prudence, that authority has to be
subject to some oversight. The executive branch should not simply be
allowed to construe statutory ambiguities—or to fill statutory gaps—
unfettered and solely as it sees fit.
That’s part of the problem, but it goes deeper than that. When talking
about the power of the executive branch, you have to keep in mind how that
power actually is wielded.
It is certainly true that the president is accountable to the electorate, and
the people that he appoints to manage his agencies are accountable to him.
The problem is that, in the vast majority of cases, the power that Chevron
11

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1802).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
13
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is,
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2580 (2006).
14
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
15
Id.
12
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cedes to the executive branch is actually held and exercised, not by the
president, and not by his political appointees, but by career staff. This power
often resides at relatively low levels, with the bureaucrats who run the
agencies on a day-to-day, decision-by-decision, policy-by-policy basis.
Let me give you an example. Last May, the Supreme Court denied a
petition for review of the First Circuit’s decision in a case called Upper
Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement District v. EPA.16 The issue in that
case was another boring, technical, arcane EPA issue—this time involving
an EPA permit requiring a public entity to spend more than $200 million to
upgrade a regional wastewater treatment facility.
That’s a lot of money, especially when you consider that the District had
just spent $180 million on upgrades to the same treatment facility in 2009.
The District asked the EPA to delay requiring further upgrades until an
ongoing study of the effect of those 2009 upgrades was completed. EPA
staff refused the District’s request, and the First Circuit deferred to the
EPA’s decision. In fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said
that a court “must generally be at its most deferential” to such EPA decisionmaking, even if it is “of less than ideal clarity.” 17
My point is not that the EPA was right or wrong in this case. My point
is that a career permit writer—the quintessential faceless bureaucrat—made
a decision costing hundreds of million dollars and that deference to the
agency effectively insulated that decision from meaningful accountability.
III. REBUILDING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
If a faceless staff permit writer is not held accountable to the courts, then
she probably is not accountable to anybody. Sure, she’s got a boss, who’s
got a boss, whose boss is a political appointee who owes her job to a
president who is accountable to the electorate. Even in theory, that is a very
attenuated kind of accountability.
And if you have worked at an agency, you know that in practice the
political appointees routinely defer to the career staff on the technical
matters that are often the subject of litigation and the object of Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council deference.18 So, in many or
even most cases, the agency leadership itself is not likely to provide
meaningful oversight. This leaves the courts as an essential, and often the
only meaningful, check and balance on bureaucratic power.
If you, like me, are uncomfortable with the rise of what I will call “the
administrative state,” then the concept of largely unfettered deference,
whether under Chevron or the Administrative Procedure Act, has to make
you squirm.19
16
Orders in Pending Cases, 569 U.S. (2013); Upper Blackstone Water Pollution
Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9 (2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. __ (2013).
17
Id.
18
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
19
Supra note 8.
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Chevron deference operates on the theory that the rule of law will be
enhanced if the judicial branch defers to the technical expertise of the career
staff in the agencies. But all too often the reality is that, as Professor Epstein has
put it, the “bureaucrats will be more intent on expanding their power than
behaving like disinterested experts whose first allegiance is to the rule of law.”20
Just consider what a senior U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) official recently said at a public meeting when asked about a decision
that he was about to issue. When asked if he was worried that the decision
would be challenged, he replied “no, because we will win as long as our
decision is not clearly wrong.” The Chevron doctrine emboldens bad
decision-making.
Career agency staff members are people with real power, in large part
because of their technical expertise. But if that same expertise exempts
them from accountability to the courts, then they are effectively not
accountable to anybody. Power without accountability is never a good thing
in a democracy.
The irony is that this deference is completely unnecessary. For nearly
thirty years, the courts have deferred to the experts in the agencies under
Chevron because of a perceived helplessness: it’s all so “confusing” for a
judge; and when you’re confused, you “go with the agency.” But for at least
the last twenty of those years, the same courts have been showing they are
actually quite capable of evaluating the judgments of “experts.”
The context is different, of course, but the courts have demonstrated
their ability to wade into highly technical areas following Daubert v. Merrill
Dow Pharmaceuticals and its progeny.21 In those cases, the federal courts
have taken on the role of “gatekeepers” by assessing expert evidence for
reliability before allowing it to be admitted.
Daubert has required the courts to weigh in on matters of real scientific
and technical controversy and to do so with complex and consequential
litigation hanging in the balance. Even if Daubert has not been an
unqualified success, it has enabled the federal courts, however imperfectly,
to fulfill an essential judicial function.
Daubert empowers the courts to ensure that the “experts,” simply by
virtue of their proclaimed expertise, do not hold unchecked sway over the
outcome of processes that the Constitution delegated to our courts. Chevron,
in contrast, has caused the federal judiciary to abdicate a parallel, and
equally essential, function.
So what we should do?
Again, I am not so naive as to think that Chevron will be going away
any time soon. I am also realistic enough to know that there is no single
solution. Certainly, some of the responsibility must fall on Congress to be
clearer when it delegates responsibility to an agency about what it can, and
cannot, do.
20

Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State is Inconsistent with the
Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 491, 505 (2008).
21
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

18

THE REGULATORY REVIEW IN DEPTH

[Vol. 3:11

Tailored amendments to the APA could be another response: to better
define the degree of review that courts should bring to bear when reviewing
agencies’ technical decisions, especially today when technical expertise is
no longer uniquely, or even primarily, housed in regulatory agencies.
And, finally, I would argue that the courts should do more themselves,
as they do under Daubert. In so doing, they should demand more rigor as
well from the agencies that are defending their actions. It should no longer
be sufficient for agency decision makers to assume that the only hurdle they
have to meet is simply not being “clearly wrong.”

